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INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION:
THEORY AND OPERATION IN
PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATIONS
DR. MURAT CAN PEHLIVANOGLU*
ABSTRACT
Involuntary dissolution is recognized as the primary mechanism to moni-
tor opportunism and remedy the aggrieved minority shareholders of cor-
porations. Contrary to general understanding, involuntary dissolution is
not idiosyncratic to close corporations. However, its application to pub-
licly traded corporations requires an approach different than the one for
close corporations. This note discusses and recommends the approach
necessary to justify and effectively enforce involuntary dissolution stat-
utes’ application in the context of publicly traded corporations. It ex-
presses the opinion that the contractual view of corporate law would
provide the theoretical basis necessary to construe the statute for publicly
traded corporations and exemplifies its approach through the shareholder
oppression law of the U.S. corporate law.
INTRODUCTION
Greater contractual freedom in corporate law, brings greater judicial ac-
tivism.1 This is a consequence of the fact that the parties in long-term
relational contracts do not adopt complete contracts which address all
* S.J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law; LL.M., LL.B., Istanbul Bilgi University.
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potential contingencies and conflicts.2 Legislatures do not ignore the fun-
damental manner in which the participants make corporate bargains3 and
empower the courts through “involuntary dissolution” (i.e., “judicial dis-
solution”) statutes to monitor opportunism that arises due to this incom-
plete contracting.
The involuntary dissolution statutes are recognized as the primary mech-
anism to monitor opportunism and to remedy the aggrieved minority
shareholders of close corporations.4 While the conduct permitting the ap-
plication of an involuntary dissolution statute is more easily found in the
context of a close corporation, there is no reason to limit the conception
to such context.5 As a matter of fact, the legislatures’ equipment of im-
precise language in involuntary dissolution statutes reveals the deliberate
intention to avoid restrictive construction.6 Hence, it is no surprise that
the involuntary dissolution is seen among the remedies for minority
shareholders of publicly traded corporations as well as close corpora-
tions.7 Involuntary dissolution law is applied to publicly traded corpora-
tions by courts in many jurisdictions such as Canada, United Kingdom,
New Zealand, Hong Kong, Bermuda and the U.S. states of Maine and
Maryland.8
The inherent differences between the close and publicly traded corpora-
tions, and their shareholders, require the deployment of different ap-
proaches to justify and effectively enforce the involuntary dissolution
statute in the context of publicly traded corporations. This note discusses
the rationale of the involuntary dissolution law and recommends the ap-
proach necessary to enforce this rationale in the context of publicly
traded corporations through the most common ground for involuntary
dissolution, “shareholder oppression”, from the lens of U.S. corporate
law. It aims to loosen the judicial reluctance when courts deal with com-
2. Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The
Case of Shareholder Contracts, UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003).
3. Mohamed F. Khimji & Jon Viner, Oppression-Reducing Canadian Corporate Law to a
Muddy Default, 47 OTTAWA L. REV. 123, 150 (2015).
4. Linda L. Shapiro, Involuntary Dissolution of Close Corporations for Mistreatment of Mi-
nority Shareholders, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 1119, 1122 (1982).
5. Redmon v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225 (2006).
6. Re Saul D. Harrison and Sons plc, [1995] B.C.L.C. 1, 14, (Hoffmann LJ.) (Eng.).
7. IOSCO FINAL REPORT ON PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN LISTED ISSUERS, 31
(June 2009), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD295.pdf.
8. Murat Can Pehlivanoglu, Controlling the Non- Pecuniary Private Benefits of Influencing
Shareholders in Publicly Traded Corporations Through Judicial Dissolution 217 (2018) (unpublished
S.J.D. dissertation, Golden Gate University School of Law) (on file with author).
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plaints for the involuntary dissolution (or its alternative remedies) of
publicly traded corporations.9
I. SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
The grounds for involuntary dissolution, and the persons who may file an
involuntary dissolution complaint, vary among jurisdictions. In the U.S.,
involuntary dissolution statutes generally grant dissolution when there is
deadlock among directors or shareholders, when directors or those in
control have been guilty of illegal or fraudulent or oppressive actions
towards shareholders, or when the property of the corporation is being
wasted.10 Among these, “oppression” appears as the most common
ground11 implemented by state legislatures for involuntary dissolution.12
While some state statutes do not include “oppression” among its dissolu-
tion grounds in precise language, courts nevertheless apply its principles
through the interpretation of similar articulated or theoretical grounds.13
It is important to underline that the allegation of “oppression” does not
appear as a claim for relief, but rather, a legal standard to be fulfilled
before a court may order liquidation (or alternative remedies) of a corpo-
ration.14 State legislatures generally made no attempt to define oppres-
sion15 and the definitions have been embraced by case law.16 The courts,
faced with the problem of deciding which acts are oppressive and on
what basis to determine the existence of oppressive acts, have developed
three definitions (i.e., standards) to define “oppression”17: (1) A burden-
some, harsh and wrongful conduct, a visible departure of fair dealing,
and violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his
money to corporation is entitled to rely;18 (2) a conduct closely related to
the violation of the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by
9. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1147 (“Judicial reluctance is most formidable, however, when
courts interpret and apply involuntary dissolution statutes.”).
10. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. §§ 1104, 1104-a (1979); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 (1975).
11. Carol L. Kline, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations: Modeling Czech
Investor Protections on German and the United States Law, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229,
243 (2000).
12. White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
13. For example, see O’Very v. Spectratek Technologies, Inc., No. CV 03-00540, 2004 WL
5642004 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2004).
14. Reget v. Paige, 242 Wis.2d 278 (2001).
15. Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc., 343 S.C. 587 (2001) (citing the official
comment to S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-400 (1990)).
16. John J. Chapman, Corporate Oppression: Structuring Judicial Discretion, 18 ADVOC. Q.
170, 189 (1996).
17. Scott v. Trans- System, Inc., 148 Wash.2d 701 (2003).
18. Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1984).
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the majority to the minority shareholders;19 (3) a violation of the reason-
able expectations of the minority.20 Accordingly, the conduct which sat-
isfies the adopted definition for “oppression” is deemed “oppressive”.
Among these definitions, the “reasonable expectations” standard appears
as the most widely accepted one.21
The theoretical approach illuminating shareholder oppression law is built
on the contractual view of corporations.22 Likewise, the oppression ac-
tion is empowered to be attentive to context and rejects the hyper-textu-
alist construction of the corporate relationship.23 It is not developed as a
ground to resolve mechanical corporate disputes like a deadlock in cor-
poration’s governance. Therefore, the discussion of the involuntary dis-
solution’s application to publicly traded corporations through the
oppression ground would be instructive regarding judicial dissolution’s
eligibility in the publicly traded corporation context and the liberal con-
struction of the applicable theoretical approach.24
II. RATIONALE IN THE CLOSE CORPORATION CONTEXT
The rationale for applying the involuntary dissolution statute to close
corporations can be better understood by analyzing the motive and nature
of the oppressive conduct. Oppression is usually directed at a shareholder
personally25 with the purpose to “freeze-out” or “squeeze-out” that mi-
nority shareholder.26 The terms “squeeze-out” or “freeze-out” means the
use of strategic position to eliminate one or more of its owners or partici-
pants from the corporation.27 While a minority shareholder need not to
be deprived of his shares to be squeezed out, “he can be oppressed by
actions which reduces his claim on the corporation’s assets or deprives
19. O’Brein v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377 (2007).
20. Pehlivanoglu, supra note 8, at 150.
21. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts,
and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 728-31 (2002).
22. Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1161, 1202 (2010).
23. Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne & Cindy A. Schipani, Feminism(s), Progressive Corporate
Law and the Corporate Oppression Remedy: Seeking Fairness and Justice, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
61, 100 (2017).
24. See Part V. Theoretical Approach.
25. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 N.J. 488 (1993).
26. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule
Isn’t What It Used to Be, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 13, 33 (2001).
27. “It may be defined as the use of corporate control vested in the statutory majority of share-
holders or the board of directors to eliminate minority shareholders from the enterprise or to reduce
to relative insignificance their voting power or claims on corporate assets. . . . Furthermore, it im-
plies a purpose to force upon the minority shareholder a change which is not incident to any other
business goal of the corporation.” Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370 (1977).
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him of the return on his investment to which he is entitled.”28 Common
freeze-out techniques include the termination of a minority shareholder’s
employment,29 the refusal to declare dividends (or declaration of inade-
quate dividends), the siphoning off of corporate earnings through high
compensation to the majority shareholders or related-party transactions
violating arms-length principle,30 mergers31, and misapplication or waste
of corporate funds.32 When these are the case, the minority shareholders,
having no ready market for the stock of a close corporation, can be
“locked-in” to the corporation, yet “frozen-out” from any business
returns.33
Accordingly, it is said that the primary purpose of the shareholder op-
pression law is to protect the shareholders’ investment,34 because the op-
pressive conduct leaves the shareholder without any adequate means of
recovering his investment.35 This argument is supported by the fact that
involuntary dissolution statutes generally provide less drastic remedies
than dissolution and the most common alternative remedy is the buyout
of the oppressed investor’s holdings.36 The logical implication of this
view is that oppression liability arises when the value of a shareholder’s
investment is harmed.37 Herein, the function of the standards (i.e., defini-
tions) that define oppression is seen as a key to identify whether the
investment is harmed.38
28. F. Hodge O’Neal & Ronald R. Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or
Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 327 (1975).
29. Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 112 A.D.2d 423 (1985) (“As a result of their
long history of taking an active part in the running of the corporation, petitioners demonstrated that
they had a reasonable expectation that they would continue to be employed by the company and
have input into its management. In Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc. (Gardstein), the Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged that such expectations, if not realized, amount to oppression because the major
part of the earnings of a close corporation are distributed in the form of salaries, bonuses and retire-
ment benefits.”).
30. Garry D. Justis, Avoiding a Minority Shareholder Oppression Claim in a Close Corpora-
tion in Missouri: The Impact of the New Close Corporation Statutes, 56 MO. L. REV. 274 (2011).
31. Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262 (1979).
32. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 143 N.J. 168 (1996).
33. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas, supra note 26, at 14.
34. For a discussion of the wider policy considerations behind the enactment the involuntary
dissolution statute, see generally, Pehlivanoglu, supra note 8.
35. Ballard v. Roberson, 399 S.C. 588 (2012) (“The concern and focus in shareholder oppres-
sion cases is that the minority ‘faces a trapped investment and an indefinite exclusion from participa-
tion in business returns.’”).
36. Douglas Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will In the Close Corporation:
The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. III. L. REV. 517, 546 (1999).
37. Id. at 551.
38. Id. at 552.
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III. RATIONALE IN THE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION
CONTEXT
While it is acknowledged that the publicly traded corporation can be the
subject of oppressive acts,39 justifying the application of the involuntary
dissolution statute to publicly traded corporations through a rationale
such as the “harmed investment value” may be, at first glance, problem-
atic. After all, there is, in most instances, a ready market for the shares
and investors purchase the shares of a publicly traded corporation with
the purpose of receiving dividends or selling the shares at an appreciated
value.40 Furthermore, when a corporation sells a share to investors (and
whenever investors buy its stock on the market), the investors knowingly
consent implicitly to the arrangements, including the ones which may be
deemed “oppressive”, that the corporation has disclosed. Because in the-
ory, if the investors wanted to have more favorable terms in their con-
tract (e.g., articles of incorporation) with the corporation, they would
have withheld their investment.41 Even more strikingly, a shareholder
who buys the share knowing the presence of oppressive conduct in the
corporation, is already compensated by buying the share at a lower price
that reflects that fact,42 as an efficient market reflects the oppression to
the price even when an individual shareholder is not aware of the fact.43
While these assertions have a plausible basis, realities are intact. Firstly,
oppressive conduct harming the shareholder’s investment is in effect in
the context of publicly traded corporations both through the common
freeze-out techniques stated above and unconventional techniques such
as extraction non-pecuniary private benefits.44 The purpose of the con-
duct causing the oppression of the minority in publicly traded corpora-
tions appears as the desire to extract disproportionate gains from the
39. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201 (1982).
40. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141 (1979).
41. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (1989).
42. “If shareholders buy into corporations knowing that they are run by managers and control-
ling shareholders who can temper profit-maximization, then shareholders will have bought in at
lower stock prices that reflect that fact and can claim no tax or injury when the tempering occurs.”
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 787
(2005).
43. Christopher A. Riley, Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act
1985 and the Role of the Courts, 55 MOD. L. REV. 784 (1992).
44. Extraction of non-pecuniary private benefits equally happens in close corporations. How-
ever, while the non- pecuniary private benefit in the close corporation is generally extracted through
a managerial position (in this case, the common freeze-out technique of employment termination
applies), this is not the case with the publicly traded corporation as the management and the share-
holders of this institution are generally disconnected.
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corporation: This desire directly harms the value of the minority’s invest-
ment even though the minority is neither the target nor the subject of the
conduct.45 Secondly, investors in publicly traded corporations have little
ability to negotiate the arrangements, and their understanding about the
looseness of corporate participants’ obligations is problematic.46 Moreo-
ver, without an adequate disclosure, shareholders cannot be deemed
“consented” to the frustration of their expectations.47 Even when there is
adequate disclosure, shareholders would not meaningfully consent those
arrangements, because consent to such oppressive actions would be un-
derinformed due to transaction costs.48 Thirdly, a publicly traded corpo-
ration might change its long-standing policy at some point during an
investor’s participation in the corporation49 and an investor who bought
the share at a price that did not reflect the oppression might find himself
in a position that was not foreseeable in advance:50 His exit by selling the
45. See generally Pehlivanoglu, supra note 8.
46. Brudney, supra note 41, at 1420.
47. “In much the same way, variations of core fiduciary or structural rules might be both un-
fairly surprising and inefficient even if impounded into the price. What will be impounded into the
price is the average likelihood that managers will exploit such a provision in a manner that will
significantly decrease shareholder wealth. This average may be quite small, but many investors may
well have preferred not to invest in a corporation whose stock was subject to significant losses as a
result of substantial nonbusiness risks.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law,
89 COLUM L. REV. 1461, 1521 (1989).
48. “The quality of the consent to such variations would be even weaker in publicly held cor-
porations, where true bargaining is almost impossible, and knowledge of the variation, let alone its
meaning and implications, would typically be lacking. In publicly held corporations, the problem of
systematically underinformed consent would apply not only to core fiduciary rules, but to core struc-
tural rules, because just as core fiduciary rules govern traditional conflicts of interest, so core struc-
tural rules govern positional conflicts. . . . Persons who proposed to buy stock in a publicly held
corporation therefore would either have to expend resources to determine whether the corporation
was subject to all the core rules that constrain unfair self-dealing, shirking, and positional conflicts
by top managers, or assume that all corporations had adopted variations of those core rules. Either
course of action would render capital markets less efficient, because investors would either put less
of their money into corporate securities or demand a higher return from such securities, than would
otherwise be the case.” Id. at 1522.
49. Re Mediavision Ltd., [1992] 2 H.K.C. 629 (H.K.) (“[t]hat management may change, that
management could indeed change its own mind”).
50. “On the other hand, if shareholders buy their shares expecting pure profit-maximization,
then they will have bought at prices that reflect that expectation and thus will suffer a loss if profits
are sacrificed. Nor can they avoid the economic loss that results when a corporation embarks on a
course of sacrificing profits by just selling their shares because the now-expected decline in future
earnings will be capitalized into the market price at which they can sell their shares.” Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 787 (2005).
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share at the market at a price now reflecting the oppression fact51 would
cause an unfair loss for him.52
Accordingly, in the context of publicly traded corporations, any unjusti-
fied action which frustrates the investor’s expectation of receiving suffi-
cient dividends or selling the shares at an appreciated value would be
oppressive since it would frustrate the basic reasonable expectations of
the shareholders.53 In this case, shareholders faced with oppression
would lack an effective escape as the market will provide a lower break-
up price for the minority shareholders.54 Therefore, the “harmed invest-
ment value” rationale, which is built on the lack of escape mechanism
reality in close corporations,55 is partly in effect in the publicly traded
corporation context as well. Then, the rationale of applying the involun-
tary dissolution remedies to publicly traded corporations can be traced to
the willingness to remedy the shareholders when the price of the share in
the marketplace is depressed.56
In the context of publicly traded corporations, the involuntary dissolution
legislations would be explicable as part of a program to make public
investment in securities markets more attractive.57 Since a share of a cor-
poration is more than a capitalized dividend stream,58 there should be
51. After all, the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information including any misrepresentations. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
52. Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance and
Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 493 (2017).
53. See generally Pehlivanoglu, supra note 8. The shareholders of a publicly traded corpora-
tion may well have other purposes which might be classified among reasonable expectations pro-
tected through involuntary dissolution. For more discussion, see, Pehlivanoglu, supra note 8, at 229.
54. “It is curious, and unusual, for shareholders in a public company to ask a court to order the
company buy shares they can sell on the public market. The shares in question are listed on the
Winnipeg stock exchange. Particularly if the only complaint is a lack of confidence, the quick,
cheap, and simple solution is to sell them. I believe the Court can ask what is really going on
here. The shareholders obviously consider the public market to be grossly under-valued. They seem
to believe that the learned Chief Justice has uncovered a valuable right of which the market has been
unaware: the right to force purchase at break-up value. At no point in his Reasons did the learned
Chief Justice say that the shareholders could force a purchase at break-up value. But he did say that
there was oppression, and he did say that the shareholders had a reasonable expectation in the main-
tenance of a high break-up value.” Westfair Foods Ltd. v. Watt (1991), 115 A.R. 34 (Can. Alberta
Q.B.).
55. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Ques-
tion of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 759 (2000).
56. Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model
for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1969).
57. Deborah Demott, Oppressed but Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment of Canadian
Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLS.
222 (1993).
58. See Gambotto v. WCP Ltd. (1995) 182 CLR 432 (Austl.).
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safeguards against its expropriation by the state or private citizens. Not
surprisingly, expropriation of private rights in corporate law is only
granted through unambiguous statutory expression of legislative inten-
tion, such as mergers with appraisal as exclusive remedy59 or private
contracting. In this regard, involuntary dissolution statutes function as a
law providing a safeguard against the expropriation of private rights
through opportunism.
IV. THEORETICAL APPROACH
The effective enforcement of the involuntary dissolution statute in the
publicly traded corporation context would be better ensured if the “nexus
of contracts” theory of corporate law, the most academically influential
attempt to articulate the doctrinal basis for corporate law in the U.S.,60 is
considered. According to the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporate
law, corporations are not mere entities but a nexus of contracts61 in
which corporate constituents contract with the corporation.62 This con-
tractual view of corporations produces the notion of “corporate contract”,
which is an umbrella contract that includes all parties’ bargains and as-
serts that the “corporate contract” should be characterized by a process of
construction rather than a passive discovery.63 Therein, corporate law’s
primary function is conceived of as the facilitation of the parties’ bar-
gains.64 It is argued that “corporate law, both statutory and judicial, acts
as a set of standard terms that lowers the cost of contracting”65 and that
corporate law will fulfill its function if the contract created by the corpo-
ration statute matches the results of costless bargaining.66 The terms of
the contract is articulated by the default and mandatory rules of corporate
law.
59. For a discussion of appraisal as exclusive remedy, see, Mitchell Partners L.P. v. Irex Corp.,
656 F.3d 201 (2011).
60. Ross Grantham, The Rights of Company Shareholders, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 578 (1998).
61. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 12 (1991).
62. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance
8-9 (UCLA, School of Law Research Paper No. 02-06, 2002) (“Yet some deference should be
shown the corporation’s status as a legal person. Corporate constituents contract not with each other,
but with the corporation. . . . The various constituencies thus must be (and are) linked to the nexus
and not to each other.”).
63. Christopher A. Riley, Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act
1985 and the Role of the Courts, 55 MOD. L. REV. 785 (1992).
64. Grantham, supra note 60, at 579.
65. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 236-37.
66. Brian R. Cheffins, An Economic Analysis of the Oppression Remedy: Working towards a
More Coherent Picture of Corporate Law, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 775, 787 (1990).
9
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Capital market law (i.e., securities law) is the principal component of
corporate law67 and it regulates the institution of publicly traded corpora-
tion to a wide extent. Contractual theory is applicable to this area of law
as well and the issues that it is regulating constitutes the remaining terms
of the corporate contract.68 After all, “an offer of securities to the public
is an offer to enter into a contract whereby members of the public will
acquire securities from their issuer. . . . The terms of that contract are
based on the marketing material (prospectus) which is produced by the
issuer of those securities before their issue and on a continuing basis
thereafter”.69 Due to the mandatory nature of securities law, the terms of
this contract are automatically added to the contract.70 In this sense, se-
curities law provides standard contract terms and decrease the transaction
costs;71 and in theory, the terms it mandatorily imposes on parties are, in
fact, ones that the parties would have added.72 Then, the corporate con-
67. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 276.
68. “The articles may not be the only contractual terms of the relationship between the com-
pany and a shareholder. The company and a shareholder may establish additional contractual ar-
rangements governing their relationship. These additional agreements are typical where a different
class of shares created and issued, such as preference shares or redeemable shares. The terms of
issue of these shares, typically contained in the issue document, supplement the provisions in the
articles.” SUSAN MCLAUGHLIN, UNLOCKING COMPANY LAW 148 (2d ed. 2012).
69. ALASTAIR HUDSON, SECURITIES LAW 329 (Sweet & Maxwell 2008). The historical evolu-
tion of securities law in England can be traced to recognize this nature of the securities law: “Even in
the Victorian period of the promoters before the company acquired its distinct personality, there
would be some advertising literature which sought to induce investors to spend their Money on
acquiring securities of the given kind. This advertising material was known as a prospectus.” (HUD-
SON at 23). Consequently, the common law dealing with investment contracts has dealt frequently
with the provisions of prospectuses (HUDSON at 24). The offer of securities and their acquisition
constituted a contract. The principal focus of the litigation, therefore, tended to focus on the question
whether or not those promoters had committed fraud in the marketing of the company or had some
negligent misrepresentation or misstatement in the formation of the contract for sale of the shares
(HUDSON at 22). Similarly, advisors to the company, whether or not they were directors of that
company or partners in a joint stock company, also faced similar liability for any involvement in the
making or dissemination of such statements (HUDSON at 22).
70. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486 (1952) (“The relation between a corporation and a
preferred shareholder is one of contract, especially as to the preferential right secured by the terms of
the issue.”).
71. Ronald Coase outlines the concept of “transaction costs” as follows: “In order to carry out a
market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people
that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw
up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure the terms of the contract are being
observed, and so on. These operations are costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
72. Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 287 (2008) (“The statutory norms were not problems for public corpora-
tions, because the norms themselves mirrored the governance structures favored by public corpora-
tions. They were, however, a problem for the close corporations participants who desired to change
those governance mechanisms.”).
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tract regarding the publicly traded corporation “can be viewed as a stan-
dard form multiparty contract, some of the terms which are specified by
statute.”73 As a result, it can be expressed that “a stockholder’s right
between himself and the corporation and the other stockholders are con-
tractual, and that the terms of the contract are to be found in the agree-
ment of association and the provisions of applicable statutes.”74
One important function of the “default rules of corporate law is to pro-
vide a means of accommodating, over time, developments that cannot
easily be foreseen at the outset.”75 After all, “transaction costs affect the
ability of the parties to make exhaustive agreements capable of address-
ing all possible contingencies that may arise in the course of their rela-
tionship”76 and it is understood that the parties in long-term transactions
or contracts (i.e., relational contracts),77 such as shareholders in corpora-
tions, do not adopt complete contracts which address all potential contin-
gencies and conflicts.78 As a corollary, it is generally assumed that issues
such as “shareholder oppression” would have been bargained by share-
holders if bargaining were costless,79 and oppressive conduct “violates
the agreement that the parties would have reached . . . if they had negoti-
73. Kirshnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 159 (1987); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 III. 260 (1949) (“The
terms of this contract are embodied in the charter of the corporation and in the appropriate provisions
of the corporation statute in force at the time the articles of incorporation were adopted.”).
74. Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397 (1994).
75. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21 (2d ed. 2009).
76. William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. IN’L ECON. L. 995, 1002 (1996).
77. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
805, 814 (2000) (The phrase “long-term contracts” is generally used as a synonym for relational
contracts.).
78. Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The
Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2003); Charles J. Goetz, Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091-92 (1981) (“A contract is
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement
to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to
identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations ade-
quately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance. As the discussion
below illustrates, long-term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements to fit this conceptu-
alization, but temporal extension per se is not the defining characteristic . . . In conventional con-
tracts, the parties generally are able to reduce performance standards to rather specific obligations.
By contrast, relational contracts create unique, interdependent relationships, wherein unknown con-
tingencies or the intricacy of the required responses may prevent the specification of precise per-
formance standards. Complexity and uncertainty each play conceptually distinct roles, although they
frequently operate in combination.”).
79. Cheffins, supra note 66, at 789 (“It is generally assumed that participants in corporations
would bargain for protection against oppression and unfair prejudice if bargaining were costless”).
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ated a solution to the disputed point.”80 In fact, this is the reason why the
oppression statutes give the “shareholder the benefit of a hypothetical
bargain that she never memorialized in an enforceable agreement.”81
Herein, the involuntary dissolution law is used as the umbrella concept
which provides the statutory terms for the “corporate contract” on issues
regarding contingencies that may arise in the course of the corporate
relationship.
V. APPLYING THE THEORY
Relying on the contractual view, once it is acknowledged that the pres-
ence of a default involuntary dissolution rule is necessary for corporate
law to fulfill its function, the enforcement of the statute should be con-
strued through the principles of the contractual view as well. In this
sense, under “a contractarian framework, the oppression action is a de-
fault contractual term embedded in any contract between a corporate
stakeholder and the corporation” and the broad language of the statute
“leaves it to the courts to determine what approach to contractual gap-
filling should be undertaken when interpreting the oppression provi-
sions.”82 As a consequence, using the most widely accepted standard as
the touchstone, it can be said that jurisdictions that have adopted the
“reasonable expectations” standard to define oppression “embrace the
central tenet of the nexus of contracts theory of the firm, that the primary
role of corporate law should be to enforce participants’ contract.”83
According to the contractual theory, an economic analysis does not
solely focus on enforcement of expressly articulated bargains and pays
attention to bargains never fully articulated as well, “because at some
point the costs of setting out a bargain in writing will exceed the bene-
fits.”84 In most instances, some parts of the agreement are left unwritten.
Also, as the nature of the corporate contract is a long-term transaction
rather than a discrete one, it is not possible to foresee and articulate every
possible conflict that may arise in the contract in the future;85 and “eco-
nomically rational investors will often prefer to live with an incomplete
80. Michael E. DeBow, “Oppression” of Minority Shareholders: Contract, Not Tort, 54 ALA.
L. REV. 128, 128 (1993).
81. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 144 (2003).
82. Khimji & Viner, supra note 3, at 142.
83. Terry A. O’Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A
Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON
HALL L. REV. 646, 691 (1992).
84. Cheffins, supra note 66, at 785.
85. O’Neill, supra note 83, at 659.
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bargain, addressing problems later, if and when they arise.”86 In this re-
gard, the “shareholder oppression doctrine reduces the need for expen-
sive ex ante bargaining, allowing the participants to proceed with an
incomplete agreement.”87
Economic theory88 suggests that both the express terms of the agreement,
and the terms that the agreement would have included if the negotiations
had been costless, should be equally considered to fully construe the par-
ties’ agreement (i.e., corporate contract).89 Herein, the most widely ac-
cepted standard of the oppression ground, the “reasonable expectations”
standard, exists to make the following construction: “reasonable expecta-
tions constitute the bargain of the parties in light of which subsequent
conduct must be appraised.”90 In this sense, it appears as a method that is
used to find or interpret the explicit or implicit terms of the contract.91
Not surprisingly, the reasonable expectations standard is already in use in
different contexts of corporate law for both close and publicly traded
corporations.92
Then, to decide whether the involuntary dissolution remedy should be
applied to a publicly traded corporation through a ground such as “op-
pression”, the parties’ bargains first have to be fully understood. Thus,
the bargains’ terms, so its sources, need to be located. In the close corpo-
ration context “the array of rights possessed by any particular share-
holder may well vary from one corporation to the next, because
shareholder rights may spring from many sources: (1) the corporations
organic documents, (2) agreements between shareholders or between the
corporation and shareholders, (3) statutory corporation law, and (4) deci-
sional law governing the operation of corporations.”93
86. Means, supra note 23, at 1187.
87. Id. at 1194.
88. Mary-Hunter Morris, Only “The Punctilio” If I Say So: How Contractual Limitations on
Fiduciary Duties Deny Protection to Victims of Oppressive Freeze-outs Within Private Business
Entities, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 73, 77 (2008) (“The view of the business entity as a “nexus of contracts”
was conceptually born as a result of the avid acceptance that the law and economics theory found
within business law.”).
89. Cheffins, supra note 66, at 792-93.
90. Application of Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
91. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. V. Marnel, 587 F. Supp. 622 (1983) (“The most likely resort to
reasonable expectations . . . would be as an interpretative tool where the language of a policy is
ambiguous. . . . There is logic to a reasonable expectation being used as a construction tool where
there is ambiguity in policy language.”).
92. For example, in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (1998), the Dela-
ware court expressed that the reasonable expectations standard can be used to determine the rights of
preferred shareholders if there is ambiguity in the contract.
93. Schautteet v. Chester Bank, 707 F. Supp. 885 (1988).
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However, as the contractual relationship between the publicly traded cor-
poration and its shareholders is different than in the close corporation,
the sources of the bargain would also be different. This is due to the
following reason: In the context of close corporations, the nature of the
corporate contract generally remains intact as if it is a partnership con-
tract because both the parties and the understanding between them gener-
ally remains unchanged and the newcomers purchase the shares by most
likely knowing both the implicit and explicit conditions of the member-
ship.94 However, once a corporation becomes a publicly traded one, new-
comers purchase the shares from the market and the dispersed nature of
the shareholders makes it impossible for the newcomer to know the im-
plicit terms unless those are disclosed to the public (i.e., made explicit).
While this fact does not prohibit the application of the oppression stan-
dards, such as the “reasonable expectations” standard, for investors of
public securities in general,95 it produces the requirement for a limitation
on the sources of the bargain in the context of publicly traded
corporations.96
Then, the determination of the sources which the oppression ground
should consider depends on the acknowledgement of the following prin-
ciple: The disclosure policy of capital market law (i.e., securities law),
regarding publicly traded corporations, forces a limitation implementa-
tion on the sources of the oppression analysis, and accordingly, only the
explicit sources should be considered. Otherwise, the certainty, stability
and trustworthiness of the marketplace would be undermined97 and the
transaction costs would eventually increase since every allegation of an
implicit term would require a deep judicial evaluation. For instance, the
“reasonable expectations” should be structured from the following ex-
plicit sources: (1) the statutory provisions (both corporate and capital
market law) and additional layer of regulations (particularly, the listing
rules), (2) corporation’s organic documents (e.g., articles of incorpora-
tion, bylaws) and general assembly (i.e., shareholders’ meeting) or board
of directors’ resolutions,98 and (3) public disclosures (i.e., announce-
94. Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. Harris, 119 III. App. 3d 136 (1983).
95. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II, 65 A.3d 539
(2013) (applying the reasonable expectations theory for the benefit of the holders of public
securities).
96. O’Neill, supra note 83, at 658 (“For publicly traded corporations, there is an obvious diffi-
culty in determining whether the shareholders got what they bargained for”).
97. After all, “clearly defined legal rules that enable people to ‘know the nature of their rights
and obligations and be able to plan their actions with some confidence about the legal conse-
quences.” John A. Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in the Louisiana Civil Law Tradition:
From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing Act and Beyond, 63 LA. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (2003).
98. Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 137 N.C. App. 700 (2000).
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ments).99 Among these sources, the public disclosures deserve a special
explanation due to its continuing nature and unique position in the opera-
tion of publicly traded corporations. Other explicit common sources pre-
sent the same characteristics as in the close corporation.
VI. USING PUBLIC DISCLOSURES AS A BASIS FOR THE
COMPLAINT
The connection between the contractual view of corporate law, involun-
tary dissolution and the sources for analysis can be better understood by
discussing why and how a public disclosure can be accepted as a source
for oppression. The “efficient capital market hypothesis” accepts that the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all pub-
licly available information (including any material misrepresentations),
and an investor who buys or sells shares at the price set by the market
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Thus, an investor’s reli-
ance on any public representations (including misrepresentation) may be
presumed.100 Using the contractual theory, it can be said that the infor-
mation mandatorily disclosed by the issuer statutorily supplements the
terms of the corporate contract.101 Once these disclosures are accepted as
99. Although not discussed in U.S. law, Canadian law accepts that public announcements of a
publicly traded corporation are “promises” that can create reasonable expectations. For examples,
see Themadel Foundation v. Third Canadian Investment Trust Ltd., 1995 CanLII 7040 (Ca. Ont.
Sec. Com.) (“It strikes me that once the “promise” has been made (in a corporate/securities legisla-
tion sense as we have here through the information circulars and press releases which are to be
translated into the issuer bids), then this promise becomes a reasonable expectation which deserves
protection through the oppression provisions. . . . I think it reasonable that shareholders be entitled to
rely on written and public pronouncements of what corporations in which they hold shares will do.
This is especially so in the case of corporations which offer their shares to the public as it is an
offence for such corporations to be other than truthful in public pronouncements.”) and Ford Motor
Co. Canada, Ltd. v. Ontario Mun. Emp. Ret. Bd., 2006 CanLII 15 (Can. Ont.). Similar grounds are
also asserted in some U.K. law cases by claimants and courts. For an example by a claimant, see
Bradman v. Trinity Estates plc, [1989] B.C.L.C. 757 (Eng.): “One of the grounds of the application
under sec. 459 is said to be that the transaction is prejudicial to members in that it represents a
departure from what was held out to them in the prospectus . . . .” For an example by a court, see Re
Leeds United Holdings plc, [1997] B.C.C. 131 (Eng.): “It may be that in certain cases the court can
find a relevant legitimate expectation outside the company’s constitution that can be relied on for s.
459 purposes even in the case of a public company, but such circumstances must, it seems to me, be
rare.”
100. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
101. One may assert that relying on a provision that has an administrative remedy, rather than
civil remedy as a basis in oppression claim, can mean that a civil remedy is created for the provi-
sions violation through judiciary. For example, see Chapman, supra note 16, 213 (“The expensive
wording of the oppression remedy raises the question as to whether the oppression remedy can be
used as a means of civil enforcement of the continuous disclosure provisions.”). However, this is not
accurate. The securities law provisions are added to the oppression equation through the contractual
theory and does not by its own establish a civil liability.
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a term of the contract, it is easier to say that these can be used as a source
for the analysis of an oppression.102
Accordingly, it is fair to ask whether a simple media advertisement or
coincidental communication (e.g., answering an inquiry of a newspaper,
or a managers’ speech given during a conference in a university, or an
unauthorized officer’s reply to an investor’s inquiry e-mail), unrelated
from an investor relations department or mandatory disclosures, would
give rise to a source for oppression.103 Applying the contractual theory
once again, it should be underlined that the reason why a disclosure
made in accordance with securities law would give rise to an oppression
source is that these disclosures would act as a supplement to the terms of
the contract between the corporation and the shareholders due to the stat-
utory framework that ties certain liabilities and rights to these dis-
closures. On the other hand, any advertisement or coincidental
102. The court’s reasoning in the U.S. case, Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital
Funding Trust II, 65 A.3d 539 (2013), presents an analysis for this issue: “The reasonable expecta-
tion of the public investors —in this case, the holders of the Trust Preferred Securities—must there-
fore be given effect. The investors’ reasonable expectation in this case is that the DresCap Trust
Certificates are Parity Securities. That result is hardly novel or surprising, because the Bank itself
created that expectation: (i) in various communications with its German regulators, (ii) in its own
internal communications, and (iii) with third parties. Particularly telling is that in a November 2009
e-mail exchange, a Bank employee, in response to an investor’s inquiry, confirmed that, ‘[Y]es, the
[DresCap Trust I Certificates] is a hybrid Tier 1 instrument which would qualify as a parity instru-
ment.’ That communication and others like it confirm that of the two competing interpretations, the
Trustee’s interpretation is the more reasonable, because the Defendants themselves believed— and
contributed to the investment community’s reasonable belief—that the DresCap Trust Certificates
were Parity Securities.” Building on the reasoning in this case, it can be said that a response of the
investor relations department of a corporation can play a role in the interpretation of an issue and
contribute to the expectations of a shareholder and deem it a reasonable one. After all, this depart-
ment speaks on behalf of the issuer, and the information it gives or discloses to the particular inves-
tor would be done in accordance with the securities law, and thus become a part of the contract
between the corporation and the shareholder. While one can assert that this particular answer would
stay in between the two parties and can only contribute to the specific reasonable expectations of an
investor (which is not considered in the context of a publicly traded corporation), this argument will
fail: The fact that any material information should be disclosed to the public obliges the issuer to
announce the information given to a particular investor to the public, and failure to do this does not
change the nature of the information. It just means that there is a violation of the disclosure require-
ment, and the material nature of the information is enough to elevate it to a level that would deem it
a term between the corporation and the shareholders in general.
103. The Swissair/Wibru decision, represents an example of liability that a shareholder can have
due to advertisements or coincidental communications. In that case, the court opined that the adver-
tisement and project announcement letters created a legitimate expectation for the consumers who
engage in a contractual relationship with a subsidiary, and the parent should be liable for the breach
of trust in corporate groups. See Hasan Pulasli, Turk Ticaret Kanunu Tasarisina Gore Sirketler
Toplulugunun Temel Nitelikleri ve Hakim Sirketin Guven Sorumlulugu [Companies According to
Turkish Commercial Law: The Basics of the Community and the Rights of the Company Trust Re-
sponsibility], GAZI UNIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKULTESI DERGISI [GAZI UNIV. FACULTY L.J.] C. XI,
Sa.1-2 270-75 (2007), available at http://webftp.gazi.edu.tr/hukuk/dergi/11_11.pdf.
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communication that is not made as a part of the securities law require-
ments would not have this effect.104 Although these might be used as
extrinsic evidence that would establish the basis of the implied terms of
the corporate contract in close corporations, granting their usage in the
context of publicly traded corporations would greatly damage the integ-
rity of the market. After all, in theory, investors make their investment
decisions relying on the information disclosed in accordance with securi-
ties law because only these are given a legal effect and added as terms to
their contracts with the corporation.105
VII. CONCLUSION
The construction of the involuntary dissolution statute is not incompati-
ble with the nature of a publicly traded corporation. However, its com-
patibility depends on the approach used to interpret the statute. An
involuntary dissolution statute would effectively remedy and restrain op-
portunistic behavior in the publicly traded corporation only if the statute
is construed through a convenient doctrinal basis and analysis, such as
the one suggested in this note.
Although the shareholder oppression is not the only ground for involun-
tary dissolution and so the discussions of this note is inconclusive, evalu-
ating the issue through this most common ground proves that the policy
considerations behind the involuntary dissolution statute is equally appli-
cable to publicly traded corporations as well. Accordingly, this note
claims that there is no need for judicial reluctance to apply the involun-
tary dissolution statute to these corporations. Shareholder opportunism is
an institutional reality and corporate law should not be ignorant of the
features, such as the involuntary dissolution law, the law inherently
possesses.
104. However, this does not mean that these communications do not give rise to civil and crimi-
nal liability under securities laws’ market manipulation rules.
105. For instance, under the U.S. securities law, Regulation Fair Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §.
243.100, which “is aimed at prohibiting the selective disclosure of information in order to promote
the full and fair disclosure of information to the public” (S.E.C. v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp.
2d 694 (2005)), would support this qualification in cases such as disclosures made through social
media platforms (Press Release, SEC Says Social Media OK for Company Announcements if Inves-
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